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The Effect of Financial Status on Earnings
Quality of Chinese-Listed Firms
FENG LI, INDRA ABEYSEKERA, SHIGUANG MA*
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

This article investigates the relation between accounting-based
earnings quality attributes and the financial status of Chinese
companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
from 2005 to 2007 by classifying them as either “healthy” or
“bankrupt” firms. The authors find that accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness are significantly
different between healthy and bankrupt firms, but not earnings
persistence. Additional analysis undertaken indicates that firm categories (healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt) based on
financial status does not indicate distinct differences in earnings
quality attributes.
KEYWORDS financial
quality, China

status, healthy,

bankrupt, earnings

1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the administrative governance approach adopted in China, regulators often rely on accounting numbers to govern the listed companies (Lu &
Liu, 2007). For example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
requires listed firms to meet certain level of return on equity (ROE) before
they can apply for a permission to issue additional shares to existing shareholders (rights issues); and the most important criterion for delisting a listed
company is a reported net loss for three consecutive years (Qi, Wu, & Wu,
* Corresponding Author: Dr. Shiguang Ma, School of Accounting and Finance, University of
Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australia. E-mail:
shiguang_ma@uow.eud.au, T e l : 6 1 2 4 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 .
1

2

2005). A peculiar feature of Chinese-listed firms is that some of them that
should be declared as financially distressed and/or should be declared as
bankrupt (in terms of the criteria used in developed countries) are still being
listed on the stock markets in China, in contrast with those in mature stock
markets in developed countries (Ronen & Yaari, 2008).
Altman (2006) developed an emerging market score model (EMS)
Z score to categorize firms as healthy, financially distressed, or
bankrupt. The firms listed on the emerging stock markets of China can
be identified under the EMS model due to the earlier noted peculiarity
of the listing status of Chinese stock markets. Borrowing the EMS model Z
score to categorize Chinese-listed firms into two categories, this study
investi- gates the status of accounting-based earnings quality attributes
between healthy and bankrupt firms as the key investigation and
earnings quality attributes between healthy, financially distressed, and
bankrupt firms as a supplementary investigation. Francis, LaFond, Olsson,
and Schipper (2004) identified four accounting-based earnings quality
attributes (accruals quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness) and
market-based earnings quality attributes
(relevance, timeliness, and
conservatism). This study uses accounting-based earnings attributes only
fication is built upon accounting data
as the EMS model firm classirather than market data. Although we do not rule out the notion that
market-based earnings attributes can inform about the two firm categories
under the EMS model, given our focus on accounting-based earnings
quality, it is more appropriate to deal with market-based earnings
attributes in a separate study. Our findings suggest that the bankrupt firms
have the lower earnings quality measured in regards to accruals quality,
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness, but not as regards earnings
persistence.
Our two motivations for this study contribute to the literature as follows. First, to the best of our knowledge, no research has been conducted to
ascertain the status of the four accounting-based earnings attributes (accruals
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness) among the two principal firm categories (healthy and bankrupt) using
the EMS Z score criterion. Second, our research article is one of the few
analyses of accounting-based earnings quality attributes across the listed
firms of the emerging Chinese market, based on the assumption in prior
literature that desirable earnings qualities can reduce the information risk to
investors in their decision making.
The next section outlines a review of relevant literature and firm classification based on financially-healthy status. Then, we explain the measures of
earnings quality and develop hypotheses. After that, we design t h e research
method, followed by t h e analyses on our empirical results. Finally, we
conclude our research.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND FINANCIAL STATUS
CLASSIFICATION
The literature to date has characterized four earnings attributes as indicators
of earnings quality: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness (Francis et al., 2004). Accruals quality
refers to the extent to which accruals map onto the related cash flow realization, when accruals shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time
so that the adjusted earnings becomes a better measure of firm performance
(Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, & Nabar, 2006). Earnings persistence captures the
concept of earnings sustainability; persistent earnings are viewed as desirable because they are recurring (Penman & Zhang, 2002; Richardson, 2003).
Earnings predictability refers to the ability of current earnings to predict
future earnings. Earnings smoothness refers to the use of accruals to smooth
earnings using management’s private information to reflect earnings more
accurately with cash flows from operations; low smoothness means that
a firm’s management has not engaged in smoothing practices (Chaney &
Lewis, 1995; Demski, 1998; Ronen & Sadan, 1981).
The literature contains several possible earnings quality constructs.
Schipper and Vincent (2003) provided three such constructs, including three
derived from the time-series properties of earnings: persistence (measured
as earning persistence), predictive value (measured as earnings predictability), and variability (measured as accruals quality, and earnings smoothness).
Although earnings persistence and predictive value might typically go handin-hand, Schipper and Vincent noted that volatile earnings might be high
quality as measured by persistence, but low quality as measured by predictive value. Francis, Olsson, and Schipper (2008) focused on how the
precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by
investors.
The EMS model is a predictive model that combines four different financial ratios to determine the likelihood of bankruptcy among firms using a Z
score index (Altman, 2006). This model was first developed in the mid-1990s
to provide an analytical framework for the analysis of the then-growing,
but still nascent−emerging market firms issuing bonds in non-local currency
(usually U.S. dollars) (Altman, 2006). In the Chinese capital market context,
unusual to many other stock exchanges, some firms are in financial distress or bankrupt in terms of the criteria used in developed countries but
are still being listed on the stock exchanges, flagging their near-bankruptcy
or bankruptcy status to investors. Therefore, bankrupt firms have a prebankruptcy status in the Chinese stock markets. Due to the anomalous listing
system in the Chinese stock exchange, we use the EMS model to split sample firm-year observations into healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt
categories using Z scores of firm-year observations.
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The EMS model is as follows (Altman, 2006):
EM Score = 6.56∗X1 + 3.26∗X2 + 6.72∗X3 + 1.05∗X4 + 3.25

(1)

Zones of discrimination:
Z > 5.65 – Safe Zone (indicating healthy firms in this study)
1.75 < Z < 5.65 – Grey Zone (indicating financially distressed firms in this
study)
Z < 1.75 – Bankruptcy (indicating bankrupt firms in this study).
where,
X1
X2
X3
X4

= working capital/total assets
= retained earnings/total assets
= EBIT/total assets
= book value of equity/total liabilities.

The constant term of 3.25 in the Model 1 is derived from the median Z
score for bankrupt U.S. entities, to standardize the analysis so that a default
equivalent rating is consistent with a score below 1.75 (Altman, 2006). Altman
(2006) stated that the EMS model was tested on samples of manufacturers
and non-manufacturers, public firms, private firms, and specific industries
(e.g., retailers, telecoms, airlines, etc.), more than 20 countries including
China, and its accuracy and reliability have remained high. The foundation
of the EMS model is an enhancement of the Z score model, resulting in
an EMS and its associated bond rating equivalent (BRE) (Altman, 2006). The
EMS rating equivalent is then modified based on three critical factors: (1) the
firm’s vulnerability to currency devaluation, (2) its industry affiliation, and
(3) its competitive position in the industry (Altman, 2006).

3. MEASURES OF EARNINGS QUALITY AND RELEVANT
H YPOTHESES
The idea behind the hypotheses for this study follows from Rosner (2003).
Rosner examined U.S. firms under four categories: non-stressed and nonbankrupt, stressed and non-bankrupt, non-stressed and bankrupt, and
stressed and bankrupt. In that study, a given firm’s stress was an ex-ante
measure, and bankruptcy was an ex-post measure. The firm classification is
based on the criteria developed by McKeown et al. (1991). Although their
classification has a similar analogy to Altman (2006) firm classification as
healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt, their study assigns stressedbankrupt status to a firm if it exhibited any of the following symptoms:
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(1) negative working capital in the current year, (2) an earnings loss from
operations in any of the three prior years to bankruptcy year, (3) an earnings loss in any of the three prior years to bankruptcy year, (4) a retained
earnings deficit in any of the three prior years to bankruptcy year. According
to the firm classification advanced by McKeown et al., a firm later going
into (ex-post) bankruptcy but not showing any of the four symptoms prior
to bankruptcy was identified as non-stressed and bankrupt, and a firm later
avoiding bankruptcy but showing any of the four symptoms was identified
as stressed and non-bankrupt. Rosner (2003) examined income-increasing
earnings manipulation of these four firm categories using various proxies:
receivables and inventory overstatement; payables and accrual expenses
understatement; net working capital/current accruals overstatement;
property, plant and equipment overstatement; and poor cash flow indicators.
Rosner found that firms that appear (ex-ante) non-stressed and (ex-post)
bankrupt hid their financial stress through
earnings manipulation,
resembling Securities Exchange Commission–sanctioned fraud firms.
Although this study examines earnings quality attributes rather than
earnings manipulation as Rosner (2003) did, she demonstrated that firm
behavior can be studied
under
broad firm classifications. A firm
classification, specifically ex-ante non-stressed and ex-post bankrupt are
likely to hide their earnings quality through earnings manipulation. Using
Rosner as a learning platform, we classify firms into broad spectra, but we
posit that the firm classification put forward by McKeown et al. (1991) is
inappropriate to Chinese listed firms, because Chinese stock exchanges
allow firms that are technically bankrupt by Western norms to continue
their listing status, making them ex-ante bankrupt firms. We instead use
Altman’s (2006) firm classification that uses financial status as the construct as
McKeown et al.’s study did to identify firms as healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt. Financially distressed firms under Altman are similar
to McKeown et al.’s classification: non-stressed and bankrupt, and stressed
and non-bankrupt firms, and in this study we disregarded financially disTressed firms for the main empirical model, because as found by Rosner it is
likely that they manipulate earnings, and their earnings quality is driven by
earnings manipulation.
In relation to Altman’s (2006) Z score that is founded on the strength
of firms’ balance sheets, it is likely that healthy firms have higher earnings quality than bankrupt firms, and therefore these firms’ categories are
significantly different, because strength of accounting-based information is
more important in determining earnings quality attributes (Barker & Imam,
2008). The choice of the four accounting-based earnings attributes are chosen because each attribute informs a different dimension of earnings quality.
The accruals quality is a measure that informs about the cost of funds
(debt and equity); earnings persistence informs about earnings recurrence
or sustenance of earnings from one reporting period to another; earnings
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predictability informs about earnings forecast accuracy, an aspect desirable
to standard setters, analysts, and firm valuations (e.g. for mergers, and acquisitions); and earnings smoothness informs regarding the extent to which
190 managers have contributed their privately-held information about the
firm to report a more useful earnings number (Francis et al., 2004). Each
earnings attribute is outlined next.

Accruals Quality
Accruals quality as a measure of earnings quality is based on the view
that earnings can be matched more closely into cash flow from operations. Dechow and Dichev (2002) measured earnings quality as capturing the
mapping of working capital accruals onto last-period, current-period, and
next-period cash-flow from operations. A typical Dechow–Dichev accruals
quality measure begins with a model that relates total current accruals to
lagged, current, and future cash flow from operations (Francis et al., 2008).
The measure of accruals quality in this study is based on Dechow and
Dichev’s model as follows:
TCAj,t
CFOj,t−1
CFOj,t
= b 0 + b1 ∗
+ b2 ∗
TotalAssetj,t−1
TotalAssetj,t−1
TotalAssetj,t−1
CFOj,t+1
+ b3 ∗
+ εj,t
TotalAsset j,t−1

(2)

where,
TCA j, t = Firm j’s total current accruals in t (ΔCA j, t − ΔCL j, t − ΔCash
+ ΔSTDEBT j. t + Δ TP j, t )
Total Assetj, t−1 = Firm j’s total assets in year t–1
CFOj, t = Firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t
CAj, t = Firm j’s current assets in year t
CLj, t = Firm j’s current liabilities in year t
Cashj, t = Firm j’s cash in year t
STDEBTj, t = Firm j’s debt in current liabilities in year t
TPj, t = Firm j’s taxes payable in year t.

j, t

The measure of accruals quality is based on the standard deviation of
estimated residual σ(ε̂j, t ), which refers to the extent to which current
accruals map onto operating cash-flow realizations. Large (small) values of
estimated residual correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality and lower
(higher) earnings quality.
Accruals quality measures the precision with which accruals predict
future cash flows (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, &
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Schipper, 2005; McNichols, 2002). Prior evidence that firms with higher
accruals quality have lower cost of capital suggests that high-quality accruals
improve firms’ earnings-based valuation (Aboody, Mary, & Ron, 2004; Francis
et al., 2004). We expect that healthy firms have a cash-flow position in the
past, present, and future and that are most likely to mirror their accruals,
thereby informing higher accruals quality. The bankrupt firms, on the other
hand, are likely to have a poor cash flow position in the past, present, and
future and are less likely to match their accruals with cash-flow position,
thereby informing lower accruals quality. Based on our expectations, we
state the hypothesis of accruals quality as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Accruals quality in healthy firms is significantly higher than
that of bankrupt firms.

Earnings Persistence
To measure persistence, researchers generally estimate a regression of the
future value of the variable on its current value (Dechow & Schrand, 2004).
Sloan (1996) evaluated whether cash flow from operations and accruals have
different implications for the persistence of future earnings and tested the
ability of earnings to forecast future earnings, concluding that those earnings
that can accurately forecast future earnings are more persistent.
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) used firm-level regressions of current earnings on previous year’s earnings to estimate the slope-coefficient estimates
of earnings persistence. This study employs the measure in Kormendi and
Lipe to test earnings persistence using the following equation:
Earnj,t
Earnj,t−1
+ Vj,t
= α + δ1 ∗
TotalAssetsj,t−1
TotalAssetj,t−1

(3)

where,
Earnj, t = Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t
Earnj, t−1 = Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t−1.
The measure capturing earnings persistence is based on the slopecoefficient estimate (δ 1 ). Values of δ 1 close to one (or greater than one)
indicate highly persistent earnings whereas values close to zero imply highly
transitory earnings. Persistent earnings are viewed as higher quality, whereas
transitory e a r n i n g s are viewed as lower quality.
Earnings persistence refers to the likelihood a firm’s earnings levels
will recur in future periods (Nichols & Wahlen, 2004). However, when
firms report earning losses, it can be that those firms recognize expected
loss transactions as incurred in that reporting period (Basu, 1997). By
including
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these expected but unrealized losses in a current reporting period, the firm
converts a series of future loss transactions into a single transitory loss as
reported in the current period. Secondly, losses can also indicate that the
firm is likely to liquidate the assets generating the loss (Hayn, 1995). Third, a
realized loss could result from a negative shock accompanied by liquidation
of assets or cash expenditures. The negative shocks are likely to be immediately realized, whereas positive shocks are realized gradually over time.
These factors make earning losses less persistent than earning gains (Hayn,
1995). Because bankrupt firms have poor balance sheets partly because of
more earning losses made over the reporting periods, we expect bankrupt
firms to demonstrate less persistent earnings than healthy firms. We state the
hypothesis of earnings persistence as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Earnings persistence of healthy firms is significantly higher
than that of bankrupt firms.

Earnings Predictability
Dichev and Tang (2009) investigated the relation between earnings volatility
and earnings predictability and found a negative relationship between earnings volatility and earnings predictability. They also concluded that earnings
volatility has substantial predictive power spanning up to 5 years into the
future.
Lipe (1990) provided a measure of earnings predictability as it reflects
the variance of earnings shocks: with the increase in variance, the predictability decreases. Francis et al. (2004) measured earnings predictability using the
square root of the estimated error-variance from the earnings-persistence
equation. In this study, earnings predictability is calculated using the square
root of the error variance from equation of earnings persistence:

Pred j ,t = σ 2 (νˆ j ,t )

(4)

where,
σ 2 ( ν̂j,t ) = Estimated-error variance of firm j in year t, calculated from
Equation 3.
Our measure of earnings predictability is the standard deviation of the
residuals ( ν̂j,t ) from Equation 3. Large values of Pred j,t imply less predictable
earnings and lower earnings quality.
A number of important applications of accounting data require the
prediction of earnings. For example, valuation research and practice typically use projections of earnings to derive estimates of firms’ equity value.

9

A related application is the use of accounting data to derive, and possibly
improve on, analysts’ earnings forecasts. Dichev and Tang (2009) found that
the consideration of earnings predictability brings substantial improvements
in the prediction of short- and long-term earnings, reducing errors in predictability. We expect healthy firms to have more predictable earnings than
bankrupt firms, which are likely to have more earning losses, and are likely
to engage in pernicious earnings management. We state the hypothesis of
earnings predictability as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Earnings predictability in healthy firms is significantly higher
than that of bankrupt firms.

Earnings Smoothness
Discussions of the benefits of smooth earnings include Demski (1998),
Wysocki (2004), and Francis et al. (2004). Arguments that smoothness is a
desirable earnings attribute derive from the view that managers use their private information about future earnings to smooth out transitory fluctuations
and thereby achieve a more representative, hence more useful, reported
earnings number.
In measuring smoothness, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) used cash
flow from operations as a reference construct for unsmoothed earnings and
measure smoothness as the ratio of earnings variability (i.e., smoothed) to
310 cash flow from operations variability (i.e., unsmoothed). Bowen,
Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2003) measured earnings smoothness as the
standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by the standard
deviation of earnings. Francis et al. (2004) measured earnings smoothness as
the ratio of standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items as
proposed by Bowen et al. but standardized them by lagged total assets,
and this study employs the following equation:

Smooth j ,t =

σ (CFO j ,t / TotalAssets j ,t −1 )
σ ( Earn j ,t / TotalAsset j ,t −1 )

(5)

where,
σ = Firm j’s standard deviation
CFOj, t = Firm j’s operating cash flows in year t
∑(Earn j, t ) = Firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t.
Ratios in excess of one indicate more variability in operating cash flows
relative to the variability of earnings, indicating a wider disparity between
unsmoothed earnings and smoothed earnings. The disparity is considered to
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be due to the practice of using accruals inappropriately. Thus, large (small)
values of smooth indicate more (less) earnings smoothness and low (high)
earnings quality. As noted earlier, the financial statements of near-bankrupt
firms are more likely to reflect evidence of material overstatements,
presumably motivated by a desire to conceal signs of distress, than those
of non-bankrupt firms (Rosner, 2003).
An earnings management strategy that has survived the test of time is
smoothing. Smoothing can be the outcome in some circumstances, for
instance, due to the dampening of fluctuations in the series of reported
earnings (Buckmaster, 2001). Due to the administrative governance approach
adopted in China, the regulators often rely on accounting numbers to govern the listed companies, and the CSRC requires listed firms to meet certain
benchmarks on ROE before they can apply for permission to issue additional shares to existing shareholders (rights issues). The most important
criterion for delisting a listed company is reported net loss for three consecutive years. Poor-performing firms, such as those that are bankrupt, are
likely to use private perniciously managed earnings through inappropriate
use of accruals are less representative of firms’ cash flows from operations.
We believe that bankrupt firms are more likely to manipulate their earnings
to avoid delisting and have strong incentives to manage earnings to meet
necessary thresholds, and that healthy firms are less likely to do so. We state
the hypothesis of earnings smoothness as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Earnings smoothness in healthy firms is significantly higher
than that of bankrupt firms.
4. METHOD

Sample
The sample comprises firms that issued A-shares and were listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the fiscal years 2005 to 2007.
This study measures the four accounting-based earnings attributes on a firmand year-specific basis, using the relevant accounting information for rolling
5-year windows, t-4, . . . t. For example, the firm-years 2001 to 2005 are
used to calculate the earnings attributes for the year 2005, the firm-years
2002 to 2006 for the year 2006, and the firm-years 2003 to 2007 for the year
2007. Because the computation of accruals quality requires past and future
one firm-year’s observation data, so we cover the data period from 2000 to
2008.
To mitigate concern that missing information in firm-year observations
might reduce validity, we ensure that data on all variables are available for
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each firm-year observation for the sample period. The data are collected
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Financial
Databases developed by the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co.
After eliminating firms in banks and financial institutions, the final sample
has a total of 2,961 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2007,
which consisting of
1,046 healthy, 1,669 financially distressed and 246
bankrupt firm-year observations respectively.

The Model and Variables
The study includes accrual quality of earnings (AQ), persistence of earnings (PERS), predictability of earnings (PRED), and smoothness of earnings
(SMOOTH) as dependent variables in four separate econometric models to
examine the relationship between earnings quality attributes, and healthy
versus bankrupt firms. Table 1 summarizes the operational dependent and
independent variables, and their measurement attributes. The following
regression equation tests data by pooling firms across 3 years. We use
random-effect estimation in the panel data set, as variations among firms are
of interest in this study, and helps in generalizing findings to Chinese-listed
firms.
Dependent Variableit = b0 + b1 HVSBit + b2 CFOit + b3 SALESit + b4 SIZEit
+ b5 OPCYCLit + b6 NEGEARNit + z

(6)

t = 2005, 2006, and 2007 years, and i is firm-year observation.
In this econometric model, higher AQ value means lower earnings quality. Higher PERS value means higher earnings quality. Higher PRED value
means lower earnings quality. Higher SMOOTH value means lower earnings
quality. We identify healthy firms as those with an EMS Z score greater than
5.65, financially distressed as those with an EMS Z score between 5.65 and 1.75, and
bankrupt firms as those with an EMS Z score less than 1.75. We control for
cash flow variability (CFO), sales variability (SALES), firm size (SIZE),
operating cycle length (OPCYCL), and negative earnings ( NEGEARN) in the
past 5 years. The cash-flow volatility and sales volatility indicate uncertainty
of earnings and lower earning quality. Larger firms are likely to maintain
higher earnings quality than smaller firms. The longer operating cycles
indicate greater uncertainty of earnings, and lower earnings quality. The
negative earnings are past earnings losses; any estimations made about
earnings during the loss period can indicate substantial estimation errors,
and indicates lower earnings quality (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).

TABLE 1 Variable Definitions and Measurement
Variable

Proxy

Dependent
AQ

Accrual quality

PERS

Earnings persistence

PRED

Earnings predictability

SMOOTH

Earnings smoothness

Predictor
H versus B
(HVSB)

Expected Values

Standard deviation of the estimated residual using
Dechow and Dechev (2002) regression model where
total current accruals are related to previous, current,
and future period cash flows, using five-year rolling
window
Slope coefficient between current period earnings
regressed over previous period earnings using
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) regression model, using a
five-year rolling window
Standard deviation of the estimated residual using
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) regression model that
estimate earnings persistence, using a five-year
rolling window
Ratio for standard deviation of the cash flows from
operation over standard deviation of earnings in
current periods, using Bowen et al. (2003) no
constant regression model, using a five-year rolling
window

−ve to ∞

Healthy versus bankrupt firms

Firms evaluated for financial health using Emerging
Market Score (Z) of Altman (2006) for each firm year
Healthy firm codes 1 and bankrupt firm codes 0.

0 or 1

Cash flows

Standard deviation of firm’s cash flows from
operations, calculated over 5-year rolling window for
each firm year (Francis et al., 2004)
Standard deviation of firm’s sales, calculated over
5-year rolling window for each firm year (Francis
et al., 2004)
Log of firm’s total assets for each firm year
Log of firm’s operating cycle for each firm year
Firm reporting negative earnings in any of the past
5 years for each firm year, which codes 1,
otherwise, 0.
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Control
CFO

Measurement

SALES

Sales revenue

SIZE
OPCYCL
NEGEARN

Firm size
Operating cycle length
Negative earnings

−ve to ∞

0 to ∞

0 to ∞

0 to ∞
0 to ∞

0 to ∞
−ve to +ve
0 or 1
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSES
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Earnings quality attributes are positively skewed, and with a wide variation among firms. However, we inspect
the stem and leaf plot and find no outliers which significantly influence
findings. The most firms’ AQ is around 0.04, PERS is around 0.10, PRED is
around 0.03, and SMOOTH is around 0.06. The variables controlled for earnings quality attributes show that the most likely values are similar to mean
values of firm-year observations, and this could be because the values were
either standardized by log value (SIZE, and OPCYCL), or statistical value
(CFO, SALES). As evident from minimum values, some AQ and PERS values
because of firm-year observations report negative earnings, with the most
likely scenario of these firms being that the operating cash flows are less
volatile than earnings. All firms have made earnings losses during any of the
past five years prior to their firm-year observations.
Table 3 provides a correlation matrix for variables. AQ, PRED, and
SMOOTH have same signs, and PERS has opposite sign, confirming that
the lower values of the former three indicate higher earnings quality,
and the lower value of PERS indicates lower earnings quality. Cash flows
from operations variability significantly and positively associate AQ, PRED,
and SMOOTHN. Firm-size significantly and negatively associates with all
attributes of earnings quality. The behaviou of firm size with earnings quality attributes and sales volatility with earnings quality attributes (AQ, PERS,
and PRED) are contrary to our expectations from previous studies. These
unexpected findings are due to firms in the study widely differing in cash
flow volatility and sales volatility as evident from their standard deviations
being much larger than mean values. Smaller firms are likely to associate
with higher earnings quality, which is contrary to findings from firms located
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics

AQ
PERS
PRED
SMOOTH
CFO
SALES
SIZE
OPCYCL
NEGEARN

Observation

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Median

2961
2961
2961
2961
2961
2961
2961
2961
2961

0.13
0.34
0.15
0.37
0.08
0.20
9.27
1.54
1.00

0.47
1.09
0.48
0.77
0.20
0.31
0.50
0.54
0.02

−2.23
−17.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.15
−3.74
0.00

12.82
14.97
8.95
8.99
4.47
7.80
11.27
4.32
1.00

0.04
0.10
0.03
0.06
0.05
0.13
9.27
1.49
1.00

Total 2,961 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2007; AQ = Accrual quality; PERS = Earnings
persistence; PRED = Earnings predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings smoothness; CFO = Standard
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE =
Log of total assets; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN = Negative earnings dummy.

TABLE 3 Correlation Matrixes
AQ
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AQ
1
PERS
−0.034∗
Probability
0.063
PRED
0.032∗
Probability
0.078
SMOOTH
0.271∗∗∗
Probability
0.000
CFO
0.069∗∗∗
Probability
0.000
SALES
0.006
Probability
0.732
SIZE
−0.072∗∗∗
Probability
0.000
OPCYCL −0.064∗∗∗
Probability
0.001
NEGEARN 0.004
Probability
0.816

PERS

PRED

SMOOTH

CFO

SALES

SIZE

OPCYCL

NEGEARN

1
−0.038∗∗
0.039
−0.099∗∗∗
0.000
−0.014
0.434
−0.009
0.633
0.090∗∗∗
0.000
0.013
0.468
−0.004
0.819

1
0.007
0.715
0.136∗∗∗
0.000
0.037∗∗
0.044
−0.209∗∗∗
0.000
−0.031∗
0.087
0.005
0.786

1
0.145∗∗∗
0.000
−0.003
0.889
−0.125∗∗∗
0.000
−0.071∗∗∗
0.000
0.007
0.699

1
0.089∗∗∗
0.000
−0.081∗∗∗
0.000
0.033∗
0.076
0.003
0.880

1
0.005
0.769
0.226∗∗∗
0.000
0.006
0.733

1
0.326∗∗∗
0.000
−0.029
0.118

1
−0.005
0.777

1

Total 2,961 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2007; AQ = Accrual quality; PERS = Earnings persistence; PRED = Earnings
predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings smoothness; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ; SALES = Standard deviation of sales
revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN = Negative earnings dummy.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗ ∗ Significant at better than the 5% level, ∗∗∗ Significant at better than the 1% level.
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in developed country stock markets. Firms with longer operating cycles
are large firms and firms with more sales volatility. Longer operating cycle
associates with lower earnings quality, and negative earnings associate with
lower earnings quality.

Regression Results
As reported in Table 4, each earnings quality attribute is compared between
healthy firms and bankrupt firms, and the finding that each earnings quality
attribute is significantly different is demonstrated.
Results for Accruals Quality (Hypothesis 1). As shown in Table 5,
healthy firms are significantly higher than bankrupt firms in AQ of earnings (b1 = –0.134, probability = .033), and conform to Hypothesis 1, with
healthy
firms reporting higher accruals quality. Firms with shorter operating cycles
reported higher AQ than those having longer operating cycles. The other
established variables in the literature had no significant influence on accruals
quality.
TABLE 4 Results of Mean Test and t Test for Accounting-based Four Earnings-Attributes
Quality between healthy firms and bankrupt firms
Mean Health firm
Firm Number
AQ
PERS
PRED
SMOOTH

Mean Bankrupt firm

1,046
0.062
0.671
0.035
0.076

246
0.132
0.438
0.240
0.302

Difference

t Statistic

−0.070
0.233
−0.205
−0.226

−3.95∗∗∗
1.67∗
−11.22∗∗∗
−7.54∗∗∗

Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; AQ = Accrual quality;
PERS = Earnings persistence; PRED = Earnings predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings smoothness.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗∗∗ Significant at better than the 1% level.

TABLE 5 Panel Data Regression Results for Accruals Quality
Standard
Coefficient Error (robust) Z score
H versus B
OPCYCL
NEGEARN
CFO
SALES
SIZE
Constant
Adjusted R2
Observation

−0.134∗∗
−0.074∗∗
0.047∗∗∗
0.194∗
−0.003
−0.008
0.389
0.125
1,292

0.060
0.035
0.014
0.180
0.035
0.041
0.382

−2.24
−2.14
3.46
1.08
−0.09
−0.20
1.02

Probability
0.025
0.033
0.001
0.279
0.931
0.844
0.308

Confidence
Confidence
Interval (low) Interval (high)
−0.252
−0.142
0.021
−0.158
−0.071
−0.087
−0.359

−0.017
−0.006
0.074
0.546
0.065
0.072
1.137

Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus
B = Healthy versus bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN =
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets flows scaled by assets;
SALES = Standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗ ∗ Significant at better than the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at better
than the 1% level.
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TABLE 6 Panel Data Regression Results for Persistence
Standard
Coefficient Error (robust) Z score
H versus B
OPCYCL
NEGEARN
CFO
SALES
SIZE
Constant
Adjusted R2
Observation

−0.153
−0.132∗ ∗
−0.347∗ ∗ ∗
0.096
0.166
0.436∗∗
−2.954∗ ∗
0.100
1,292

0.272
0.066
0.025
0.160
0.144
0.172
1.464

−0.56
−1.99
−13.93
0.60
1.16
2.54
−2.02

Probability
0.573
0.046
0.000
0.549
0.248
0.011
0.044

Confidence
Confidence
Interval (low) Interval (high)
−0.687
−0.262
−0.396
−0.218
−0.115
0.099
−5.824

0.380
−0.002
−0.298
0.410
0.447
0.772
−0.084

Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus
B = Healthy versus bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN =
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard
deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗ ∗ Significant at better than the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at better
than the 1% level.

Results for Earnings Persistence (Hypothesis 2). Table 6 reports results
for persistence earnings quality. There is no significant difference between
healthy and bankrupt firms in earnings persistence quality and is not consistent with Hypothesis 2 (b1 = –0.153, probability = .573). There is less
likelihood that firms that produce earnings gain would maintain their status
quo, or the firms that report earnings losses maintain their status quo over the
reporting periods. However, firms with shorter operating cycles positively
and significantly influence earnings persistence, as a shorter operating cycle
can reduce earnings uncertainty and allow firms to maintain their earnings
position with greater
accuracy. Firms that report negative earnings
significantly associate with lower earnings persistence, suggesting greater
uncertainty of maintaining consistent earnings over reporting periods.
Results for Earnings Predictability (Hypothesis 3). As reported in
Table 7, healthy firms are significantly higher than bankrupt firms in earnings
predictability (b1 = –0.292, probability = .000). This is consistent with
Hypothesis 3, with healthy firms reporting higher earnings predictability.
Although earnings losses are likely to behave in a more variable fashion
than earnings gains, because healthy and bankrupt firms have made
earnings losses in any of the past 5 years prior to their firm-year
observations, the impact of earnings losses on earnings predictability is,
therefore, not a distinct feature for Chinese-listed bankrupt firms. Contrary to
prior studies, firms in this study with more volatile cash flows from operations
report more predictable earnings, and firms with longer operating cycles
report higher earnings pre- dictability. The other established variables in the
literature have no significant influence on earnings predictability.
Results for Earnings Smoothness (Hypothesis 4). As shown in Table 8,
healthy firms are significantly higher than bankrupt firms in earnings smoothness (b1 = –0.300, probability = .002), and conform to Hypothesis 4, with
healthy
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TABLE 7 Panel Data Regression Results for Predictability
Standard
Coefficient Error (robust) Z score
H versus B
OPCYCL
NEGEARN
CFO
SALES
SIZE
Constant
Adjusted R2
Observation

−0.292∗∗∗
0.063∗∗
−0.016
0.420∗∗∗
0.000
−0.123∗∗∗
1.423∗∗∗
0.116
1,292

0.066
0.030
0.024
0.084
0.040
0.034
0.313

−4.43
2.09
−0.65
4.97
0.00
−3.62
4.55

Probability
0.00
0.04
0.52
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

Confidence
Confidence
Interval (low) Interval (high)
−0.421
0.004
−0.063
0.254
−0.078
−0.190
0.810

−0.163
0.121
0.032
0.585
0.078
−0.056
2.037

Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus
B = Healthy versus bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN =
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard
deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗ ∗ Significant at better than the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at better
than the 1% level.

TABLE 8 Panel Data Regression Results for Smoothness
Standard
Coefficient Error (robust) Z score
H versus B
OPCYCL
NEGEARN
CFO
SALES
SIZE
Constant
Adjusted R2
Observation

−0.300∗ ∗ ∗
−0.184
0.095∗∗∗
0.318∗∗∗
−0.011
0.017
0.603
0.04
1,292

0.095
0.167
0.019
0.112
0.068
0.090
0.739

−3.16
−1.10
4.91
2.84
−0.16
0.19
0.82

Probability
0.002
0.270
0.000
0.005
0.870
0.849
0.415

Confidence
Confidence
Interval (low) Interval (high)
−0.486
−0.510
0.057
0.098
−0.145
−0.159
−0.846

−0.114
0.143
0.132
0.537
0.123
0.193
2.052

Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus
B = Healthy versus bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN =
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ; SALES = Standard
deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets.
∗
Significant at better than the 10% level, ∗ ∗ Significant at better than the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at better
than the 1% level.

firms reporting higher accruals quality. Firms that report more volatile cash flows
from operations, smaller firms, and firms with shorter operating cycles positively
influence higher quality of earnings smoothness. In such instances,
it is likely that the private information which managers include to adjust earnings through accruals contribute to accurate matching of cash flows from
operations volatility with earnings volatility.

Additional Analysis
As reported in Appendix A, we identify financially distressed (FD) firms
(1,669 firm-year observations) as an additional firm category (FD = 0) and
regress pooled data with healthy firms (H = 1), excluding bankrupt firms.
Accruals quality and earnings persistence are not significantly different
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between the two firm categories, but earnings predictability and earnings
smoothness are significantly different. We conduct an analysis that compares financially-distressed firms (FD = 1) and bankrupt firms (B = 0),
excluding healthy firms. The negative earnings have high correlation with
each earnings attribute in the empirical model, and therefore are dropped
from the panel data regression. As reported in Appendix B, accruals quality, and earnings predictability are significantly different between financially
distressed and bankrupt firms, but not earnings persistence and earnings
smoothness. Findings therefore suggest that financially distressed firms are
similar to healthy firms in relation to accruals quality, and similar to bankrupt
firms in relation to earnings smoothness. Financially distressed firms are significantly different from healthy and bankrupt firms in relation to earnings
predictability.

6. CONCLUSIONS
Concluding Remarks
The findings of this study bring several policy implications to Chinese regulators. The healthy firms are significantly different from bankrupt firms in
relation to accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness,
but not earnings persistence. Additional analysis reveals that financially distressed firms and bankrupt firms are significantly different in relation to two
earnings attributes (earnings predictability and earnings smoothness), but
not with accruals quality. Financially distressed firms are not significantly
different from bankrupt firms in relation to earnings smoothness. Hence,
a presumption that all earnings attributes behave significantly differently
between healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt firms should not be
a foregone conclusion. The sample data also reveal that regardless of the
firm category, Chinese-listed firms make negative earnings in any of the
preceding 5 years.
Accruals quality is significantly different between healthy and bankrupt
firms, and financially distressed and bankrupt firms, but it is not
significantly different between healthy and financially distressed firms.
Although further investigation is necessary, it may support Rosner’s (2003)
findings that financially distressed firms engage in earnings management
to show earnings with high accruals quality. As accruals quality is closely
related to cash-flow forecasts and firms’ cost of capital, on that basis, it is
possible that costs of capital of financially distressed firms are similar to
and financially distressed firms
those of healthy firms. Healthy
significantly differ in relation to earnings smoothness, and this difference
is not significant between financially distressed and bankrupt firms. These
facts indicate to Chinese policy makers that financially distressed firms
emulate some earnings quality attributes with healthy firms, and other
earnings quality attributes with bankrupt firms, making it a grey area of firm
classification. It is with caution that policy makers should make conclusions
about the distinction of finan- cially distressed firms in relation to the four
dimensions of accounting-based earnings quality.
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Accruals quality can affect cost of capital, because it is based on the
accuracy of prediction of future cash flows, and similarity of accruals quality
behavior between healthy and financially distressed firms means the cost
of capital is unlikely to increase when the firm is financially distressed,
but can significantly increase when the firm is in bankruptcy status. The
earnings persistence in healthy firms is significantly different from that in
financially distressed and bankrupt firms and is likely to sustain their earnings
over a continuum. However, earnings volatility has an impact on earnings
predictability; as healthy firms are significantly different from financially distressed and bankrupt firms; and bankrupt firms are significantly different
from healthy firms and financially distressed firms. The private information
included by managers in accruals to determine earnings variability to match
with cash flows from operations variability, makes healthy firms different
from financially distressed and bankrupt firms; and bankrupt firms different
from healthy and financially distressed firms in relation to earnings smoothness quality. A future study investigating whether private information relates
to managing earnings enhances earnings quality for the benefit of investors
or managing earnings enhances earnings quality but to the detriment of
investors, could assist policy makers to supplement the findings of this
study.
The novelty of this research is that we classify firms as healthy,
financially distressed, and bankrupt based on Altman (2006) EMS Z score
criteria, and apply that classification to Chinese listed firms, where technically bankrupt firms (according to Western norms) are being listed on
the Chinese stock exchanges, and investigate the differences of earnings
quality attributes, contributing to earnings quality literature. In particular,
this research is probably among the first several comprehensive studies to
examine the listed firms of the largest emerging Chinese capital market.

Limitations
Our results are, however, subject to the following limitations. Because China
is new to global economic activity, its economic system and business environment can have an impact on data availability and data quality. Due to the
imperfect delisting system in China, we use the EMS model to classify firmyear observations as healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt. Although
the EMS model is tested in over 20 countries including China, the reliability of
using the EMS model in China should be further identified with its changing
economic and political landscape.
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Future Research
This article raises several questions for future research. First, future research
could use a bankruptcy model that is industry specific to investigate the
differences in industry characteristics on earnings quality attributes. Second,
a future study could investigate research questions in this study with other
proxies for earnings quality, such as the market-based attributes (value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism). Third, a future study could evaluate
the influence of non-financial information on earnings quality attributes of
Chinese-listed firms, which is currently sparsely explored. Fourth, a future
study could consider earnings management in not-for-profit firms in China,
a topic barely articulated as yet in the accounting literature.
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APPENDIX A
Panel Data Regression Results for Earnings Quality Attributes for Healthy Versus Financially
Distressed Firms
AQ
Coefficient
H versus FD
0.011
OPCYCL
−0.015
NEGEARN
0.066∗∗∗
CFO
0.140∗∗
SALES
0.006
SIZE
−0.024
Constant
0.278
Adjusted R2
0.07
Observation
2,715

AQ
PRED
PRED
PERS
PERS SMOOTH SMOOTH
Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
0.457
0.200
0.000
0.021
0.765
0.261
0.188

−0.042∗ ∗
0.018
−0.008
0.247∗∗
0.028
−0.126∗ ∗ ∗
1.273∗∗∗
0.04
2,715

0.010
0.545
0.543
0.015
0.328
0.000
0.000

0.184∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.082
−0.009
0.824 −0.004
−0.085∗
0.083
0.087
−0.124
0.745
0.563
−0.044
0.736 −0.036
0.217∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.133
−1.644∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005
1.497∗∗∗
0.09
0.06
2,715
2,715

0.004
0.887
0.003
0.000
0.402
0.015
0.004

Sample of 2,715 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 1,669 financial distressed firm-years;
AQ = Accrual quality; PRED = Earnings predictability; PERS = Earnings persistence; SMOOTH =
Earnings smoothness; H versus FD = Healthy versus financial distressed firm dummy; CFO = Standard
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ; SALES = Standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets;; SIZE =
Log of total assets; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN = Negative earnings dummy.
Significant at better than the 10% level,
than the 1% level.

∗

∗∗

Significant at better than the 5% level,

∗∗∗

Significant at better

APPENDIX B
Panel Data Regression Results for Earnings Quality Attributes for Financially Distressed Versus
Bankrupt Firms
AQ
Coefficient
FD versus B −0.079∗∗
OPCYCL
−0.056∗∗∗
CFO
0.161∗∗∗
SALES
0.018
SIZE
−0.012
Constant
0.453∗
Adjusted R2
0.03
Observation
1,915

AQ
PRED
PRED
PERS
PERS SMOOTH SMOOTH
Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient
Prob.
0.011 −0.093∗∗∗ 0.001
0.003
0.029
0.376
0.005
0.266∗∗∗ 0.004
0.339
0.024
0.323
0.659 −0.197∗ ∗ ∗ 0.000
0.083
2.087∗∗∗ 0.000
0.09
1,915

−0.121∗
0.099
0.001
0.981
−0.061
0.853
−0.080
0.384
0.234∗∗∗ 0.000
−1.648∗ ∗ ∗ 0.001
0.11
1,915

−0.068
−0.131
0.514∗∗∗
−0.015
−0.167∗ ∗
2.228∗∗∗
0.05
1,915

0.127
0.212
0.000
0.759
0.017
0.000

Sample of 1,915 firm-year observations consists of 1,669 financial distressed firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years,
AQ = Accrual quality; PRED = Earnings predictability; PERS = Earnings persistence; SMOOTH =
Earnings smoothness; FD versus H = Financial distressed versus bankrupt firm dummy; CFO = Standard
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE =
Log of total assets; OPCYCL=Log of operating cycle length; NEGEARN = Negative earnings dummy.
Significant at better than the 10% level,
than the 1% level.

∗

∗∗

Significant at better than the 5% level,

∗∗∗

Significant at better

